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In the globalizing world economy activities of multinational enterprises (MNEs) have 
growingly pervaded the economies of many countries. In the 1980s and 1990s foreign direct 
investment (FDI), the main channel of international expansion for MNEs, showed an 
unequalled growth with yearly rates of 20-40%, turning in the 2000s into a highly instable 
growth pattern. In 2001, influenced by the economic downturn in the US, the upward trend 
in FDI turned abruptly into a fall of over 40%. Then, after three ailing years, in 2005-2007 
FDI growth showed a strong rebound, with yearly increases in inflow of 33-47%.2 In the 
course of 2007 unmistakable signs of a slow-down appeared, and in early 2008 UNCTAD 
noted that the prospects for notably FDI flows to and from developed countries 
deteriorated.3 Under the actual conditions of the world in economic and financial crisis, a 
large fall in FDI can safely be forecasted. Yet, these conditions do not take away from the 
likelihood that inward and outward FDI have had a substantial impact on wages and 
working conditions in the European Union. This paper aims to present and discuss recent 
evidence on the effect of FDI, by comparing wages, working conditions, working hours and 
industrial relations in MNE subsidiaries and non-MNE (domestic) firms in seven countries: 
Belgium, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom. We 
derive our data from the continuous WageIndicator web-survey.  
 
We start in outlining the various patterns, forms and motives of expansion of MNEs, as 
these may well have diverging effects on the labour market position and wages of various 
categories of workers. Second, we go into the WageIndicator data on which this paper is 
based. We then treat wages and employment in MNEs respectively domestic firms; we give 
ample attention to the widespread academic debate and available evidence on the effects 
of FDI on wages and employment in both home and host countries, before presenting our 
own evidence. In the next sections, we will present evidence on working hours, working 
conditions and industrial relations based on the WageIndicator data. As in these three fields 
our evidence is rather unique, it does not make sense to search for comparisons with 
others’ evidence. We end up with some conclusions, in which we emphasize the importance 
of national industrial relations and national competitive structures. 
2. Patterns of expansion of MNEs 
 
After the creation of an international supply chain of agricultural products, which can be 
traced back to the origins of the Dutch VOC and the British East India Company in the 
1700s, notably US manufacturers began to move to foreign countries as soon as they had 
an adequate departmental structure in place.4 In 1867, Singer’s Glasgow sewing machine 
factory marked the first market-seeking investment abroad. The renewed rush in FDI in the 
1950s and 1960s was initiated by US enterprises, grounded on their size and new 
multinational structures, but it turned into a race with European and Japanese competitors. 
New forms and motives of FDI showed up. Since the 1960s, with the advance of information 
and communication technologies and lowering transport costs as catalysts, a growing 
number of MNEs systematically fragmented their production and relocated stages abroad, 
                                                 
2  UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) (2001, 2005, 2008) World Investment 
Report 2001 (2005, 2008). New York / Geneva. FDI growth has been measured in current prices. 
3  UNCTAD, 2008, op. cit.,78. 
4  Alfred D. Chandler jr (1962) Strategy and Structure. Chapters in the History of the Industrial Enterprise. 
Cambridge, MA / London: The M.I.T. Press, 20-41. 
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aiming at exploiting cross-country cost differentials. Labour cost differentials were an 
important driver in these “runaway industries”.5  
 
This foreign relocation of manufacturing activities can be called material offshoring, whereas 
service offshoring relates to the foreign relocation of service tasks, like financial and call 
centre operations. The relationship between offshoring and the activities abroad of MNEs is 
not exhaustive. Offshoring can also take place through arm’s length contracts with foreign 
suppliers, today usually referred to as international outsourcing. In the 1980s contractual 
relations with foreign suppliers emerged as the main form of internationalization in the 
buyer-dominated chains, catering for the needs of large retailers and clothing and 
sportswear manufacturers. Catalyst in the development of such supply chains has been the 
rise of the US-based retail giant Wal-Mart, that has arguably been called “the template 
business standard for a new stage in the history of world capitalism”.6 Finally and most 
recently, skill-seeking emerged as a new motive for FDI. In the 1990s notably German 
MNEs tended to be attracted by Central and East European Countries (CEECs) with 
relatively abundant supplies of skilled labour.7 Labour market shortages at home may have 
contributed substantially to this search,8 but a more political-economic interpretation may 
well add the exertion of managerial pressure on labour costs through confronting workers 
and their representatives with “exit options”.9  
 
Offshoring through FDI can be understood as vertical FDI, whereas horizontal FDI means 
the replication abroad of the same activities as performed domestically with the aim of 
gaining advantage in the (final) markets of host countries. Material and servicing offshoring 
as well as horizontal and vertical offshoring respectively differ in their labour market i.e. 
wage effects.10 Notably the vertical variant of material offshoring may tend to deteriorate 
home country demand for workers with low or medium levels of education. Studies of 
developments in the 1980s and 1990s in British,11 Swedish12 and German13 manufacturing 
confirm that material offshoring enlarged the so-called skill premium and was instrumental 
in increasing wage inequality. It has to be added that in the current global crisis the state of 
FDI cannot be separated neither from the growing dominance of shareholder value 
approaches of corporate governance and massive capital movements fuelled by the 
‘financialisation’ of the economy, nor from pure greed and macho behaviour, without the 
corresponding development of regulation at appropriate (global, European) levels.14  
                                                 
5  Gerald K. Helleiner (1973) Manufactured Exports from Less-Developed Countries and Multinational 
Firms, The Economic Journal, 83(329): 21-47. 
6  Nelson Lichtenstein (2006) Wal-Mart: A Template for Twenty-First-Century Capitalism, in Nelson 
Lichtenstein (ed.) Wal-Mart. the Face of Twenty-First-Century Capitalism. New York-London: The New 
Press, 3-30, here: 4.  
7  Sascha O. Becker, Karolina Ekholm, Robert Jäckle, Marc-Andreas Muendler (2005) Location Choice and 
Employment Decisions: A Comparison of German and Swedish Multinationals, Review of World 
Economics, 141(4): 693-731, here: 721. 
8  Claudia M. Buch, Alexander Lipponer (2005) Business Cycles and FDI: Evidence from German Sectoral 
Data, Review of World Economics, 141(4): 732-759. 
9  Damian Raess (2006) Hidden Political Economy of Globalization: The Transformation of Industrial 
Relations in Germany and Brazil. diss. University of Amsterdam.  
10  Rosario Crinò (2007) Offshoring, Multinationals and Labor Market: A Review of the Empirical Literature. 
Milano: CESPRI, Working Paper 196. 
11  Alexander Hijzen, Holger Görg, Robert C. Hine (2005) International Outsourcing and the Skill Structure of 
Labour Demand in the United Kingdom, The Economic Journal, 115: 860-878. 
12  Karolina Ekholm, Katariina Hakkala (2005) The Effect of Offshoring on Labor Demand: Evidence from 
Sweden. Stockholm: The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI), Working Paper No. 654. 
13  Martin Falk, Bertrand M. Koebel (2002) Outsourcing, Imports and Labour Demand, Scandinavian Journal 
of Economics, 104(4): 567-586; Ingo Geishecker, Holger Görg (2004) International outsourcing and 
wages: Winners and losers. DIW Berlin: paper. 
14  Cf. Andrew Watt (2008) The economic and financial crisis in Europe: addressing the causes and the 
repercussions, European Economic and Employment Policy Brief (ETUI-REHS), No. 3 – 2008. 
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3. The WageIndicator data 
 
As said, our data stem from the continuous WageIndicator web-survey. This survey is 
building an ever-growing dataset with information on wages, benefits, and other labour 
conditions, such as working hours, contracts, jobs and job levels, training, and collective 
bargaining coverage. The WIBAR-2 project included 12 EU member states: Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, 
Sweden, and the UK. These 12 countries accounted for 91% of the total FDI inflow in the 
EU in 2007, 85% in 2006 and even 96% of the EU total in 2005. In these 12 countries over 
150,000 wage-earners yearly complete the WageIndicator questionnaire. For various 
reasons we were not yet able to gather enough wage data as to allow for detailed analyses 
for Denmark, France, Hungary, Italy, and Sweden. The remaining seven countries jointly 
form still a considerable economic force, accounting for roughly two-third of the EU’s total 
FDI inflow: 61% in 2007, 56% in 2006 and 71% in 2005.15 
 
Our reporting of the wage effects of FDI primarily goes back on the question in this web-
survey, posed in all countries at stake, whether the worker’s firm has more than one 
location, and if so, if this is located in the country at stake or abroad. For the purpose of this 
paper, we define a MNE as a company that has one or more locations abroad, as such self-
defined by the WageIndicator respondents. In our analyses we have linked the answers on 
this question given during the year 2007 and the first half of 2008 with the answers of the 
same individuals concerning wages and working conditions in MNEs and domestic firms. 
We did so for five industries: metal and electronics manufacturing; finance and call centres; 
transport and telecom; information technology (IT), and the retail industry. 
 
Analyses have been performed for 55,111 respondents, divided across countries and 
industries as shown in Table 1.  
Table 1 Number of WIBAR-2 observations by country and industry, 2007 – 1st half 2008 
 BE FI DE NL PL ES UK Total Percent
Metal & electronics 
manufacturing  
1,167 952 7,041 5,383 314 541 1,000 16,398 29.8%
Retail 832 438 2,307 4,917 307 804 1,163 10,768 19.5%
Finance & call 
centres 
828 207 1,581 3,626 559 413 1,304 8,518 15.5%
Information 
Technology 
1,214 694 1,393 3,292 588 1,329 1,034 9,544 17.3%
Transport and 
telecom 
855 518 2,186 4,485 284 605 950 9,883 17.9%
Total 4,896 2,809 14,508 21,703 2,052 3,692 5,451 55,111 100.0%
Percentage 8.9% 5.1% 26.3% 39.4% 3.7% 6.7% 9.9% 100.0% 
 
Table 2 (next page) gives an overview by country and industry of the percentages of 
respondents that, as described above, identified themselves as working for a MNE. Of all 
respondents, 41% did so; the same percentage results if we attach the same weight to each 
country. Consequently, 59% works for a domestic firm. Across industries, metals and 
electronics shows the largest shares of workers in MNE establishments, both overall (52% 
as unweighted average) and in all seven countries. The largest share here and across 
industries can be found in Belgium (65%). The Finnish share of 21% MNE workers in retail 
is the lowest we found.  
 
                                                 
15  UNCTAD, 2008, op. cit. 
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 Table 2 Percentage of workers in MNEs in total respondents by country and industry 
 BE FI DE NL PL ES UK Ind. aver. (unw.) 
Metal &electronics 
manufacturing 
65 46 56 48 49 44 54 52 
Retail 33 21 31 24 32 27 35 29 
Finance & call 
centres 
46 27 39 47 39 33 43 39 
Information 
Technology 
47 45 37 45 35 42 47 43 
Transport and 
telecom 
49 38 45 42 30 33 43 40 
Country average 
(unweighted) 
49 36 42 41 37 36 44 41 
 
 
4. MNEs and domestic firms: wages and employment  
4.1 FDI in home countries 
We start this section discussing the literature on the wage and employment effects of 
outward FDI in the MNE home countries. We already introduced evidence on the home 
country effects of material offshoring. Till recently most studies did not present much 
evidence for the fear that MNEs have been substituting foreign for domestic jobs, 
particularly if it concerned FDI in low-wage countries. Following a vertical international 
division of labour, activities in their countries seemed complementary to the activities 
performed in the home country.16 For the US quite some studies focusing on manufacturing 
concluded for the short run to limited substitution effects on employment and hardly 
traceable wage effects, and in the long run even to a positive impact of offshoring on the 
real value-added per low-skilled worker.17 A new wave of studies on the home country 
effects of US service offshoring suggests that such offshoring has neither caused significant 
job insecurity nor wage losses for high-skilled US white-collar workers.18 Yet, one of the 
authors admits that these studies only analyzed the expansion of already existing activities 
of US-based MNEs abroad and did not cover the effects of their expansion; in-depth 
research into these extensive margin or replacement effects of FDI seems non-existent.19 
On the other hand, the same author recently found for nine Western European countries 
                                                 
16  Henrik Braconier, Karolina Ekholm (2000) Swedish multinationals and competition from high- and low-
wage locations, Review of International Economics, (8)3: 448-461; Giovanni S.F. Bruno, Anna M. Falzoni 
(2003) Multinational corporations, wages and employment: do adjustment costs matter?, Applied 
Economics, 35: 1277-1290. 
17  Robert C. Feenstra, Gordon H. Hanson (2003) The Impact of Outsourcing and High-technology Capital: 
estimates for the United States 1979-1990, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114: 907-940. Mihir A. 
Desai, C. Fritz Foley, James R. Hines Jr. (2005) Foreign Direct Investment and Domestic Economic 
Activity. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER working paper 11717; Karolina 
Ekholm, Karen-Helene Ulltveit-Moe (2007) A New Look at Offshoring and Inequality: Specialization 
versus Competition. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, CEPR Working Paper No. 6402; Ann 
E. Harrison, Margaret S. MacMillan (2008) Offshoring Jobs? Multinationals and US Manufacturing 
Employment. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, paper. 
18  Gordon H. Hanson, Raymond J. Mataloni, Jr., Matthew J. Slaughter (2005) Vertical Production Networks 
in Multinational Firms, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 87(4): 664-678; Mary Amiti, Shang-Jin 
Wei (2005) Service Outsourcing, Productivity and Employment: Evidence from the United States. 
London: London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, CPER Working Paper 5475; Rosario Crinò 
(2006) Are US White-Collar Really At Risk of Service Offshoring. Milano: CESPRI, Working Paper 183; 
Runjuan Liu, Daniel Treffler (2008) Much Ado About Nothing: American Jobs and the Rise of Service 
Outsourcing to China and India. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER 
Working Paper 14061. 
19  Crinò, 2007, op.cit., 38. 
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that service offshoring exerts positive and robust effects on domestic productivity,20 which 
does not correspond with considerable replacement effects. 
 
Wage and employment effects may be more dramatic when MNEs based in high-income 
countries invest abroad horizontally, exporting high-skill activities to other countries of this 
kind. Such FDI can easily substitute labour at home. Swedish manufacturing has been 
mentioned as an example.21 Yet Konings and Murphy, exploring wage cost differentials 
across 13 EU countries for 1993-1998, found substitution relationships to a limited extent, 
mainly significant for EU subsidiaries of northern European parent firms.22 Authors in this 
stream of research argue that most likely negative effects on wages and employment are 
limited to the short run.23 It has been argued that cost reduction and market-seeking in FDI 
of European MNEs are often intertwined – as may also be the case with horizontal and 
vertical FDI. The coexistence of forms and motives of FDI complicates predictions about 
MNE behaviour.24  
There is proof for German manufacturing MNEs that firms change their presence abroad 
only infrequently, but that these changes give rise to rare but salient labour demand effects 
in response to permanent wage differentials across locations.25 In line with this outcome, 
Checci et al found across 11 European countries that MNEs adjusted their labour demand 
faster and to a greater extent than domestic firms. MNEs create and destroy jobs faster 
than domestic firms, these authors argue, but they are able to adjust more smoothly to 
shocks affecting their labour demands.26 Unfortunately it is not very clear to what extent 
institutional factors are into play here, and what impact variations in labour market flexibility 
and employment protection may have. The results of Checci et al have been confirmed for 
Germany and France. Analysis on German firm-level datasets learned that MNEs did not 
respond systematically more to wages and output than firms only active on the domestic 
market, and the persistence of employment of both firm types was similar.27  
 
The literature provides evidence that FDI works more negatively on income equality in 
European countries with highly flexible labour markets. One route along which negative 
effects will work here is the larger volatility of MNE employment – or, in economic terms, the 
higher elasticities of labour demand of MNEs. Already in 2003, studies for Ireland28 and the 
                                                 
20  Rosario Crinò (2008) Service Offshoring and Productivity in Western Europe. Milano: CESPRI, Working 
Paper 196. 
21  Pontus Braunerhjelm, Lars Oxelheim (2000) Does Foreign Direct Investment Replace Home Country 
Investment? The Effect of European Integration on the Location of Swedish Investment, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 38(2): 199-221. 
22  Jozef Konings, Alan Patrick Murphy (2001) Do Multinational Enterprises Substitute Parent Jobs for 
Foreign Ones? Evidence from European Firm-Level Panel Data. London: London: Centre for Economic 
Policy Research, CEPR Working Paper No. 2972; Jozef Konings, Alan Patrick Murphy (2006) Do 
Multinational Enterprises Relocate Employment to Low-Wage Regions? Evidence from European 
Multinationals, Review of World Economics, 142(2): 267-286.  
23  Cf. Bruno, Falzoni, 2003, op. cit., 1287. 
24  Becker et al, 2003, op. cit., 699. 
25  Sascha O. Becker, Marc-Andreas Muendler (2006) Margins of multinational labour substitution. Frankfurt 
am Main: Deutsche Bundesbank. Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies. No 24/2006, 44. 
26  Daniele Checchi, Giorgio Barba Navaretti, Alessandro Turrini (2003) Adjusting Labour Demand: 
Multinational versus National Firms – A Cross-European Analysis. London: London: Centre for Economic 
Policy Research, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3751, 16. 
27  Claudia M. Buch, Alexander Lipponer (2007) Volatile multinationals? Evidence from the labor demand of 
German firms. Frankfurt am Main: Deutsche Bundesbank. Discussion Paper Series 1. Economic Studies 
No. 22/2007; Sascha O. Becker, Marc-Andreas Muendler (2007) The effect of FDI on job separation. 
Frankfurt am Main: Deutsche Bundesbank. Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies. No 1/2007; cf. 
for France: Vanessa Strauss-Kahn (2003) The Role of Globalization in the Within-Industry Shift Away 
from Unskilled Workers in France. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER 
Working Paper 5958. 
28  Holger Görg, Eric Strobl (2003) The Impact of Multinational Companies on Firm Survival: The Case of 
Irish Manufacturing, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 105: 581-595. 
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UK29 showed that, controlled for a number of factors, employment in MNEs had been more 
at risk than jobs in domestic firms. As most recent plant closure evidence underlines, this 
definitely holds for “footloose” investments with few linkages with the local economies.30  
4.2 FDI in host countries 
There is a strand of literature on the likelihood of MNEs paying higher wages than domestic 
firms for comparable jobs, and on growing wage inequality in MNE host countries. For some 
years researchers’ attention was focused on the effects of FDI in developing countries. 
Consistently significant wage differentials were found between foreign and domestic 
enterprises, and hardly any evidence of wage spillovers of FDI leading to higher wages for 
domestic firms.31 However, between developing and high-income countries forms, motives 
and approaches of MNE expansion may differ that much, as do economic, social and 
political conditions, that transplanting conclusions from the one country category to the 
other is quite risky. Most recently research has shed broader light on wage effects. Using a 
panel of over 100 countries for the period 1980 to 2000, Figini and Görg concluded that the 
relationship between inward FDI and wage inequality depends on the level of economic 
development. According to their results, in developed countries FDI inflows in 
manufacturing can be associated with larger wage inequality, though this effect decreases 
over time.32 FDI effects in the UK have been most widely researched. Taylor and Driffield 
found the overall impact of FDI explaining on average 11% of British wage inequality in the 
period 1983 to 1992; by and large Hijzen confirmed these outcomes for 1993-98.33  
 
Many empirical studies have established that MNEs also in developed countries pay a 
“wage premium” over wages of domestic firms for comparable jobs, and that this premium 
tends to be larger for high-skilled staff.34 However, the most recent studies give rise to a 
growing number of reservations. They stress the short-term character of positive wage 
effects. For the high-income countries Germany,35 Denmark36, Finland37 and Norway38 
anyway rather small individual wage premia (1 – 5%) have been traced. Swedish research, 
                                                 
29  Francesca Fabbri, Jonathan A. Haskel, Matthew J. Slaughter (2003) Does Nationality of Ownership 
Matter for Labour Demands?, Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(2-3): 698-707. 
30  Donald Storrie, Terry Ward (2007) Restructuring and Employment in the EU: the impact of globalisation. 
ERM Report 2007. Dublin: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions; 
Vera Glasner, Béla Galgóczi (2009) Plant-level responses to the economic crisis in Europe. Brussels: 
ETUI-REHS, Working Paper. 
31  Cf. Brian Aitken, Ann Harrison, Robert E. Lipsey (1996) Wages and foreign ownership. A comparative 
study of Mexico, Venezuela, and the United States, Journal of International Economics, 40: 345-371; 
Robert C. Feenstra, Gordon H. Hanson (1997) Foreign direct investment and relative wages: Evidence 
from Mexico’s maquilladoras, Journal of International Economics, 42: 371-393; Robert E. Lipsey, Fredrik 
Sjöholm (2004) Foreign Direct Investment, Education and Wages in Indonesian Manufacturing, in Journal 
of Development Economics, 73(1): 415-422. 
32  Paolo Figini, Holger Görg (2006) Does Foreign Direct Investment Affect Wage Inequality? An Empirical 
Investigation. Bonn: IZA. Discussion Paper No. 2336, 15. 
33   Karl Taylor, Nigel Driffield (2005) Wage inequality and the role of multinationals: evidence from UK panel 
data, Labour Economics, 12(2): 223-249; Alexander Hijzen (2007) International Outsourcing, 
Technological Change, and Wage Inequality, Review of International Economics, 15(1): 188-205. 
34  Besides references in earlier footnotes: Robert E. Lipsey (2002) Host and home country effects of FDI. 
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Working Paper 9669; OECD (2008) 
Policy Brief. The Social Impact of Foreign Direct Investment, OECD Observer, July; for the UK: Sourafel 
Girma, David Greenaway, Katherine Wakelin (2001) Who benefits from Foreign Direct Investment in the 
UK?, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 48: 199-133; Taylor, Driffield, 2005, op. cit.; Hijzen, 2007, op. 
cit.; for Germany: Geishecker and Görg, 2004, op.cit. 
35  Martyn Andrews, Lutz Bellmann, Thorsten Schank, Richard Upward (2007) Foreign-Owned Plants and 
Job Security. Nottingham: University of Nottingham Research Paper 2007/36.  
36  Nikolaj Malchow-Møller, James R. Markusen, Bertel Schjerning (2007) Foreign Firms, Domestic Workers. 
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER Working Paper 13001. 
37  Kristiina Huttunen (2007) The Effect of Foreign Acquisition on Employment and Wages: Evidence from 
Finnish Establishments, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 89(3): 497-509. 
38  Ragnhild Balsvik (2006) Is Mobility of Labour a Channel for Spillovers from Multinationals to Local 
Domestic firms? Oslo: NHH, Dept. of Economics, paper. 
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based on detailed matched employer-employee data, recently revealed a considerably 
smaller wage premium in foreign-owned firms than more aggregate studies traced. Foreign 
takeovers even tended to have no or even a negative effect on wages.39  On the other 
hand, as indicated, MNE versus domestic wages in EU countries with flexible labour 
markets may behave differently. In the current crisis this is also likely to happen in the 
transition economies of the CEECs. After the fall of communism, FDI penetrated some 
CEECs quickly, leading to considerable growth in low-skill and resource-intensive industries 
but also more up-market, in car and electrical machinery production.40 From the mid-1990s 
on a trend towards growing wage inequality linked up with inward FDI became visible, 
notably in the manufacturing industries of Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and 
Slovakia.41 Most likely this trend has been sharpened by the recent mass dismissals in 
CEEC plants of multinational car and electronics producers.42 
 
The available literature suggests that in developed countries home and host country wage 
effects of FDI tend to work in the same direction. In high-income countries both inward and 
outbound vertical FDI will most likely give rise to wage differentials favouring notably skilled 
workers in MNEs and thus to growing wage inequality, though in the 2000s these effects 
seem to dry up and the wage effects of new FDI to decrease over time. Horizontal FDI 
already seem to deliver rather small wage premia, if any. In high-income countries with 
flexible labour markets, MNE wage premia on average seem lower and most likely lowering 
as well. Wage premia of inward FDI in CEECs may remain substantial, but may be shared 
among smaller groups of workers, thus contributing to growing income inequality. 
4.3 Causes of wage differentials 
We now go into possible causes of MNE wage differentials. The usual explanation for the 
wage premium paid in MNE subsidiaries is the productivity advantage of FDI over domestic 
firms. However, notably for high-developed EU countries with many home-based MNEs it 
can be questioned whether there is a “foreign ownership advantage”. For example, an in-
depth study for Germany showed that, while German non-MNEs were less productive than 
foreign-owned firms, there was no such difference between German MNEs and subsidiaries 
of foreign MNEs. Thus, productivity spillovers could have two sources, foreign MNEs as well 
as home-based MNEs.43 Others confirm with British data that the foreign ownership 
advantage is indeed by and large an MNE advantage.44 Talking about an “MNE effect” 
seems more adequate. Moreover, “productivity” remains a very wide explanatory category. 
Advantages of MNEs in this field can be carried back to better production technology, 
superior supporting and intermediate technologies (IT, logistics), more intensive use of 
intermediate products, or better management techniques – the latter in itself representing 
an intricate category.45 The relationship between higher MNE productivity and MNE size is 
                                                 
39  Fredrik Heyman, Fredrik Sjöholm, Patrik Gustavsson Tingvall (2007) Is there really a foreign ownership 
wage premium? Evidence from matched employer – employee data, Journal of International Economics, 
73: 355-376. 
40  A.o. Slavo Radosevic, Urmas Varblane, Tomasz Mickiewicz (2003) Foreign direct investment and its 
effect on employment in Central Europe, Transnational Corporations, 12(1): 53-90; Dalia Marin (2006) A 
New International Division of Labour in Europe: Outsourcing and Offshoring to Eastern Europe. London: 
London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, CEPR Discussion Paper 5447. 
41  Peter Egger, Robert Stehrer (2003) International Outsourcing and the Skill-specific Wage Bill in Eastern 
Europe, The World Economy, 26(1): 61-72; Andzelika Lorentowicz, Dalia Marin, Alexander Raubold 
(2005) Is Human Capital Losing from Outsourcing? Evidence for Austria and Poland. London: Centre for 
Economic Policy Research, CEPR, Discussion Paper No. 5344, 19-20; Sándor Csengödi, Rolf 
Jungnickel, Dieter M. Urban (2008) Foreign Takeovers and Wages in Hungary, Review of World 
Economics, 144(1): 55-82.  
42  Glasner, Galgóczi, 2009, op. cit. 
43  Yama Temouri, Nigel L. Driffield, Dolores Anon Higon (2008) Analysis of Productivity Differences among 
Foreign and Domestic Firms: Evidence from Germany, Review of World Economics, 44(1): 32-54. 
44  Chiara Criscuolo, Ralf Martin (2005) Multinationals and US Productivity Leadership: Evidence from Great 
Britain. London: Centre for Economic Performance, CEP Discussion Paper 672, 3. 
45  Cf. Malchow-Møller et al, 2007, op. cit., 5; Lipsey, 2002, op. cit., 57. 
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not easy to grasp either. It is widely acknowledged that both MNEs and MNE affiliates are 
larger than their domestic competitors, but it stands to be seen whether these differences 
end up in productivity advantages. In technologically advanced industries, decomposition of 
productivity growth into technology and scale effects shows that the former are dominant.46 
Anyway, in our analysis we will control for establishment size. 
 
The role of human capital in creating wage premia for workers in MNEs cannot be ignored, 
though the empirical evidence at this point is not overwhelming. The outcomes of Görg et al 
(2007) lend some support for a firm-specific human capital acquisition explanation: tenure 
(years of experience) may be important, as MNE wage premia are acquired over time 
though on-the-job training.47 Yet, their evidence concerned Ghana, and the OECD counter-
argument that these effects will most likely be smaller in developed countries, sounds 
logic.48 On the other hand, it can be argued that wage premia based on vocational training 
may be substantial in countries with industry-wide vocational training institutions, like 
Germany, Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands. Even in these countries the labour 
market argument may be valid: skilled workers may be attracted by working in an MNE by 
the prospect of receiving extensive training. Such labour market competition may contribute 
to pushing domestic firms into less profitable markets, with lower productivity49 – and most 
likely lower wages. Thus, in our analysis we will also control for tenure and educational level 
of the workers involved. 
 
It seems relevant to bring factors related to national industrial relations into the analysis as 
potential causes of wage premia. Critical labour sociologists have developed frameworks in 
which MNEs basically show two approaches to their activities in host countries, adaptive to 
the current industrial relations or innovative/transferring, the latter term indicating the 
managerial aim to transfer human resources (HR) and other management practices from 
home to host country.50 Various and contradictory forces may be at stake here. On the one 
hand, with the spread of firms operating at an international level the location (establishment) 
level tends to increase in importance, which tendency can give rise to considerable variation 
in wages and working conditions.51 On the other hand, in case of horizontal investment 
abroad MNEs either tend to replicate their production and management structures in the 
host countries or expand innovative and high-skill activities in these countries – or do both. 
Encouraged by EU-wide production and marketing strategies, the most productive MNEs 
seem to have put in place management systems and structures to diffuse “best practices” 
across locations in different EU member states, with important spill-overs for industrial 
relations: benchmarking of these practices may well diminish variation in HR practices and 
working conditions.52  
                                                 
46  For example, Girma and Görg (2006, op. cit, 16) show for foreign take-overs in the UK electronics and 
food industries that positive effects on productivity growth are due to changes in technical efficiency, not 
to scale. 
47  Holger Görg, Eric Strobl, Frank Walsh (2007) Why Do Foreign-Owned Firms Pay More? The Role of On-
the-Job Training, Review of World Economics, 143(3): 464-482.  
48  OECD, 2008, Policy Brief.  
49  As found for the US: Wolfgang Keller, Stephen R. Yeaple (2003) Multinational Enterprises, International 
Trade and Productivity Growth: Firm Level Evidence from the US. London: London: Centre for Economic 
Policy Research, CEPR Working Paper No. 3805. 
50  A.o. Tony Edwards (2000) Multinationals, international integration and employment practice in domestic 
plants, Industrial Relations Journal, 31(2): 115-129; Tony Edwards, Trevor Colling, Anthony Ferner 
(2007) Conceptual approaches to the transfer of employment practices in multinational companies: an 
integrated approach, Human Resource Management Journal, 17(3): 201-217. 
51  Winfried Ruigrok, Rob van Tulder (1995) The logic of international restructuring. London/New York: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul; Glenn Morgan, Peer Hull Kristensen (2006) The contested space of 
multinationals: Varieties of institutionalism, varieties of capitalism, Human Relations, 59(11): 1467-1490; 
Marta Kahancová (2007) One Company, Four Factories: Coordinating Employment Flexibility Practices 
with Local Trade Unions, European Journal of Industrial Relations, 13(1), 67-88. 
52  Keith Sisson, James Arrowsmith, Paul Marginson (2003) All benchmarkers now? Benchmarking and the 
“Europeanisation” of industrial relations, Industrial Relations Journal, 34(1): 15-31; Ingmar Björkman, Jon 
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National institutions seem to constrain the transfer of HR practices within MNEs, but it has 
also been argued that they are porous and present only partial and temporal barriers to 
home country practices.53 EU legislation and EMU rule-setting have created EU-wide level 
playing fields for firms operating throughout the EU; recent research suggests that 
majorities of MNEs confirm to these new legal frameworks, adding to the OECD and ILO 
standards, and are even actively promoting workplace diversity and equal opportunities.54 
Such legislation and rule-setting, combined with the advance of the corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) ideology and related transparency mechanisms,55 will logically put 
pressure on MNEs to avoid discrimination according to, among other things, gender and 
working hours. Domestic firms, being less under the impact of such mechanisms, may be 
more vulnerable as to create or maintain discriminative practices. These policy differences 
may, in turn, be another factor creating MNE wage premia. Therefore, our analysis will also 
control for possible wage discrimination against females and part-time workers. 
4.4 Evidence on wages 
 
We undertook a systematic analysis of wage differentials between MNEs and non-MNEs, 
based on median gross hourly wages and taking into account the influence of five factors: 
besides establishment size, we used years of work experience (tenure) and educational 
level as indicators for human capital, as well as gender and working hours for the reasons 
described above. On this basis, we carried out regression analyses by industry to control for 
the influence of these five factors. In Tables 3a – 3e we present the outcomes of these 
analyses, including short comments. 
 
Table 3a Results of regression analysis in metal and electronics manufacturing by country  
 BE FI DE NL PL ES UK 
Constant 2.727 *** 2.307 *** 1.954 *** 1.543 *** 1.719 *** 1.528 *** 2.081 ***
Work experience 0.038 *** 0.005  0.023 *** 0.041 *** 0.026 * 0.010  0.027 ** 
Work experience SQ -0.001 * -0.000  0.000 *** -0.001 *** 0.000  0.000  -0.001 ** 
Female -0.162  -0.181 *** -0.126 *** -0.147 *** -0.148  -0.334 *** -0.144 * 
Working hours p.w. > 40 0.121  -0.004  0.045 ** 0.024  -0.063  -0.044  0.011  
Educ (1=low,…,5=high) 0.062 * 0.110 *** 0.135 *** 0.174 *** 0.245 *** 0.181 *** 0.069 * 
MNE 0.152  -0.002  0.125 *** 0.099 *** 0.375 *** 0.177 ** 0.141 * 
Company > 100 empl. -0.095  0.128 *** 0.168 *** 0.121 *** 0.006  0.042  -0.004
N 576  887  6500  4672  237  460  653  
R square 0.052  0. 152 0.167 0.255 *** 0.212  0.163  0.038
 
The results of our regression analysis for metal and electronics reveal that in five of seven 
countries there is a wage premium for working in MNEs if controlled for the five factors, 
though for Spain the influence is significant but not very strong and for the UK significant but 
rather weak. There are no significant differences for Belgium and Finland. The influence of 
working in a MNE is by far highest for Poland, followed by Spain and Belgium. 
 
Our results for retail (next page) show that in five countries there is a wage premium for 
working in MNEs if controlled for the five factors. While for the Netherlands the influence is 
significant but rather weak, there are no significant differences for Belgium and Finland. The 
influence of working in a MNE is highest for Germany, then for the UK and Poland. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
E. Lervik (2007) Transferring HR practices within multinational corporations, Human Resource 
Management Journal, 17(4): 320-335.  
53  Edwards et al, 2007, op. cit. 
54  Fabienne Fortanier, Ans Kolk (2007) On the Economic Dimensions of CSR: Exploring Fortune Global 
250 reports, Business & Society, 46(4): 457-478. 
55  Rob van Tulder, Alex van der Zwart (2006) International Business – Society Management. London: 
Routledge; Fabienne Fortanier (2008) Multinational Enterprises, Institutions and Sustainable 
Development. diss. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam. 
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Table 3b Results of regression analysis in retail by country  
 BE FI DE NL PL ES UK 
Constant 2.606 *** 2.214 *** 1.870 *** 1.247 *** 1.406 *** 1.473 *** 1.980 ***
Work experience 0.045 ** 0.042 *** 0.023 *** 0.068 *** 0.049 ** 0.024 * 0.032 ***
Work experience SQ -0.001 * -0.001 *** 0.000 ** -0.001 *** -0.001  -0.001 * -0.001 ** 
Female -0.021  -0.116 -0.151 *** -0.083 *** -0.348 *** -0.129 * -0.082  
Working hours p.w. > 40 0.155  0.047 0.044  0.135 *** -0.179  -0.002  0.101  
Educ (1=low,…, 5=high) 0.098 * 0.047 * 0.084 *** 0.120 *** 0.285 *** 0.083 *** 0.015  
MNE 0.015  0.002 0.141 *** 0.045 * 0.070  0.037  0.098  
Company > 100 empl. -0.156  0.241 *** 0.191 *** 0.121 *** 0.433 *** 0.158 * 0.266 ***
N 418  401  2014  3634  188  606  801 
R square 0.040  0.152 0.141 0.325 0.336  0.067  0.050
 
 
Table 3c Results of regression analysis in finance and call centres by country  
 BE FI DE NL PL ES UK 
Constant 2.601 *** 2.152 *** 1.925 *** 1.557 *** 0.960 *** 1.184 *** 2.252 ***
Work experience 0.008  0.042 *** 0.039 *** 0.044 *** 0.060 *** 0.045 *** 0.015  
Work experience SQ 0.000  -0.001 ** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001  0.000
Female -0.172  -0.210 *** -0.122 *** -0.212 *** -0.126  -0.193 ** -0.077
Working hours p.w. > 40 -0.093  0.114  0.126 *** 0.136 *** 0.132  0.185 * 0.102
Educ (1=low,…,5=high) 0.185 *** 0.065 * 0.126 *** 0.184 *** 0.336 *** 0.171 *** 0.053
MNE -0.027  0.079  0.155 *** 0.083 *** 0.187 ** 0.274 *** 0.088
Company > 100 empl. 0.096  0.102  0.087 * 0.095 *** 0.262 *** 0.059  0.092
N 395  198  1433  3047  386  339  884  
R square 0.078  0. 278 0.191 0.327 0.286  0.225  0.023
 
The analysis for finance and call centres shows a wage premium for working in MNEs if 
controlled for the five factors in four countries, though for Poland the influence is somewhat 
weaker. We found no significant differences for Belgium, Finland and the UK. The influence 
of working in a MNE is highest for Spain, followed by Poland and Germany. 
 
Table 3d Results of regression analysis in IT by country  
 BE FI DE NL PL ES UK 
Constant 2.556 *** 2.128 *** 1.979 *** 1.731 *** 1.974 *** 1.326 *** 2.119 *** 
Work experience 0.014  0.030 *** 0.023 *** 0.048 *** 0.073 *** 0.037 *** 0.054 *** 
Work experience SQ 0.000  -0.001 *** 0.000  -0.001 *** -0.002 *** -0.001 ** -0.001 *** 
Female 0.008  -0.110 ** -0.129 *** -0.177 -0.403 *** -0.146 *** -0.159 * 
Working hours p.w. > 40 -0.007  0.102  0.065  0.043 -0.008  0.069  0.060  
Educ (1=low,…,5=high) 0.126 *** 0.083 *** 0.119 *** 0.147 0.175 *** 0.157 *** 0.030  
MNE -0.037  0.073  0.172 *** 0.039 0.288 *** 0.117 ** 0.179 ** 
Company > 100 empl. 0.186 * 0.100 ** 0.096 * 0.065 0.124  0.119 ** 0.119
N 613  644  1278  2869  349  1074  654  
R square 0.047  0. 162 0.164 0.208 0.270  0.135  0.093
 
The results of our analysis for the IT industry reveal that here in five countries a wage 
premium for working in MNEs shows up if controlled for the five factors. Whereas for the 
Netherlands the influence is significant but rather weak, there are no significant differences 
for Belgium and Finland. The influence of working in a MNE is highest for Poland, followed 
by the UK and Germany. 
 
Table 3e Results of regression analysis in transport and telecom by country  
 BE FI DE NL PL ES UK 
Constant 2.944 *** 2.136 *** 1.717 *** 1.541 *** 1.286 *** 1.611 *** 2.354 ***
Work experience 0.025 * 0.015 * 0.026 *** 0.041 *** 0.057 *** 0.018  0.003  
Work experience SQ 0.000 * 0.000  0.000 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 ** 0.000  0.000  
Female -0.216  -0.109 * -0.085 * -0.128 *** -0.171  -0.244 *** -0.006  
Working hours p.w. > 40 0.116  -0.015  -0.065 * -0.019  -0.022  -0.111 * -0.191 ** 
Educ (1=low,…,5=high) 0.089 ** 0.082 *** 0.163 *** 0.157 *** 0.295 *** 0.099 *** 0.034  
MNE -0.142  0.024  0.161 *** 0.067 *** 0.243 * 0.165 ** -0.011  
Company > 100 empl. 0.005  0.116 ** 0.220 *** 0.134 *** 0.051  0.151 * 0.190 ** 
N 416  464  1994  3651  193  507  625  




The results of our analysis show that for transport and telecom in four of seven countries 
there is a wage premium for working in MNEs if controlled for the five factors, though for 
Spain the influence is significant but not strong and for Poland rather weak. There are no 
significant differences for Belgium, Finland and the UK. The influence of working in a MNE 
is highest for Poland, followed by Spain and Germany. 
 
Table 4 gives an overview of the results of our regressions, with the statistically significant 
differences printed bold. 
 
Table 4  Hourly MNE wage premia (MNE-non-MNE):MNE x 100) after control for five 
factors, by country and industry 
 BE FI DE NL PL ES UK
Metal & electronics manufacturing 15.2% -0.2% 12.5% 9.9% 37.5% 17.7% 14.1%
Retail 1.5% 0.2% 14.1% 4.5% 7.0% 3.7% 9.8%
Finance and call centres -2.7% 7.9% 15.5% 8.3% 18.7% 27.4% 8.8%
Information Technology -3.7% 7.3% 17.2% 3.9% 28.8% 11.7% 17.9%
Transport and telecom -14.2% 2.4% 16.1% 6.7% 24.3% 16.5% -1.1%
 
These outcomes are partly in line with the evidence from the literature as reported, partly 
they are not. The rather low to even negative MNE premia found for Finland confirm the 
evidence for the Nordic countries. Obviously, in this respect Belgium –with the exception of 
its metal and electronics manufacturing— can be included in this country category, as can 
the Netherlands, be it for the last country a bit less convincing. However, our findings for 
Germany, showing considerable MNE premia in all industries, are clearly in contradiction 
with recent other evidence for this country. The results for Poland, except for the retail 
industry showing large MNE premia, underline other findings that wage premia in CEECs 
may remain substantial. Again except for retail, the Spanish outcomes may be interpreted 
as a confirmation of what we said about the MNE premium in transition economies. The UK 
figures partly seem to confirm the lowering trend of MNE premia in high-income countries 
with flexible labour markets, though for metal and electronics and IT they do not. 
5. MNEs and domestic firms: overtime and working hours 
 
Table 5 (next page) shows our data for the differences between the percentages of workers 
receiving overtime compensation and working usually more hours than agreed in MNE and 
domestic firms, by country and industry, expressed in %-points. In a large majority of cases, 
25 out of 35, a lower share of workers receive overtime compensation in MNEs than their 
colleagues in domestic firms do. In one case MNEs and domestic firms are at par, in nine 
cases workers in domestic firms receive less frequently overtime compensation. On the 
other hand, usually working more hours than agreed, that is working overtime, is 
considerably more widespread in MNEs than in domestic firms. We found this in 30 of 35 
cases, with two exceptions in transport and telecom and one each in finance and call 
centers, IT, and retail. If we confront these findings with those on receiving overtime 
compensation, it means that the MNE wage premium calculated over weekly or monthly 
wages for considerable groups of workers in MNE establishments may be smaller than that 
presented earlier for hourly wages. This holds if the difference between the percentages 
receiving overtime compensation is less than that between the percentages working 




Table 5 Differences between percentage of workers receiving overtime compensation and working 
usually more hours than agreed in MNE and non-MNE firms (%-points), by country and 
industry 
  BE FI DE NL PL ES UK 





-6% -7% -12% -17% 5% -12% -6%




3% 9% 4% 8% 27% 4% 5%





3% 6% 0% -6% 10% -3% -3%




17% 6% 5% 9% -3% 1% 16%





-5% -13% -10% -9% -10% -4% -13%




6% 2% 3% 6% -1% -16% 8%





5% 7% -1% -2% 1% -2% -1%










-10% 19% -1% -10% -12% 4% -4%




14% 5% 12% 10% -4% 1% 9%
 
The above evidence on working overtime largely corresponds with our evidence on the 
length of the working week. Table 6 projects in first rows per industry, in %-points, the 
differences between percentages of workers usually working over 40 hours / week in MNEs 
and domestic firms, by country and industry; in second rows it does so, in hours, with the 
differences between average usual working hours/ week in MNEs and domestic firms. 
Table 6 Differences between percentages of workers usually working over 40 hours / week 
(%-points) and between average usual working hours/ week (hours) in MNE and 
non-MNE firms, by country and industry 
  BE FI DE NL PL ES 
Metal & electronics   
usual working hours > 40 difference MNE-non-MNE 7% 3% 3% 5% 11% -2%
aver. usual working hrs difference MNE-non-MNE 2.3 -1.2 0.8 1.1 0.6 0.2
Finance & call centres  
usual working hours > 40 difference MNE-non-MNE 9% 7% 13% 12% 5% 1%
aver. usual working hrs difference MNE-non-MNE 1.7 1.5 2.4 4.0 1.8 -0.3
Transport & telecom  
usual working hours > 40 difference MNE-non-MNE 2% 4% -3% 4% 10% -10%
aver. usual working hrs difference MNE-non-MNE -0.4 -0.2 -2.1  1.6 0.1 0
Information Techn.  
usual working hours > 40 difference MNE-non-MNE 5% 2% 9% 7% 3% 9%
aver. usual working hrs difference MNE-non-MNE 0.6 0.7 1.6 1.3 1.3 0.6
Retail  
usual working hours > 40 difference MNE-non-MNE 3% -1% 6% 4% -16% -9%
aver. usual working hrs difference MNE-non-MNE 1.5 0.7 1.6 2.7 -1.1 -2.1
 
In a large majority of cases MNEs show both a larger share of workers usually working over 
40 hours per week and a longer average usual working week. Along both yardsticks there 
are 8 exceptions to this rule in 35 cases, though they do not run fully parallel per country 
and industry. Concerning the share of those working long hours, retail shows most 
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exceptions (four), followed by metal and electronics and by transport and telecom (both 
two). The figure for retail in Poland is remarkable, indicating a 16%-points lower share of 
workers with long hours in MNEs, and a working week on average 1.1 hour shorter in 
MNEs. Spanish retail figures go in the same direction.  
Regarding the incidence of long hours, the difference between MNEs and domestic firms is 
largest in finance and call centers (unweighted average 8.9%-points), followed by the IT 
sector (6.6%pts), metal and electronics (3.6), and transport and telecom (1.1). Retail shows 
the reverse outcome, with an incidence of long hours 2.0%-pts more in domestic firms. 
Finance and call centers and IT do not show any country exceptions to the ‘larger share of 
long hours in MNEs’ rule. As for countries, the Netherlands pops up with the largest 
difference (unweighted average 6.6%-points), followed by Belgium and Germany (both 
5.6%-pts), while Spain shows the reverse pattern with a 2.2%-pts larger incidence in 
domestic firms. 
6. MNEs and domestic firms: working conditions 
 
Other than for wages and employment figures, evidence on differences between the 
performance of MNEs and domestic firms is especially scarce in this field. After reviewing 
the existing literature, Ekholm in 2004 concluded that “whether (the multinationals) offer 
better or worse working conditions is an issue that has not been explored in a systematic 
way”56 In 2008 the OECD staff confirmed that still “very little is known about the impact of 
foreign ownership on non-wage working conditions”57 Our WIBAR-2 project covered a 
number of aspects of job quality and working conditions, like working in dangerous 
conditions; work-stress related issues; the match between job and educational level; the 
incidence of promotion; the incidence of and respondents’ expectations concerning 
reorganizations; job satisfaction; job security, and training. In this paper we concentrate on 
differences in outcomes between MNEs and domestic firms concerning work-related stress 
and reorganizations. 
 
Concerning the incidence of work-related stress, we have got information for five of seven 
countries: Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, and Spain. Table 7 (next page) 
shows the differences between scores on the four indicators of perceived work-stress we 
used, in MNEs and domestic firms by country and industry. We indicate the differences in 
%-points. One should keep in mind that a negative sign indicates a lower stress level in 
MNEs and a higher in non-MNEs. 
First it has to be noted that the differences are mostly quite small, or non-existing: a ‘0’ 
indicating no difference pops up in 30 of 100 cases. Substantial differences can mainly be 
found for Germany, notably in transport and telecom and IT. The outcomes concerning 
three indicators, ‘finds job stressful’, ‘work mentally exhausting’ and ‘finds job boring’, point 
in the direction of higher stress levels in MNEs, though not very convincing. Out of 25 
cases, ‘finds job stressful’ gives 11 times a higher level for MNEs, 4 times a lower level and 
10 times no difference. For ‘work mentally exhausting’ these figures are 13, 4 and 8 
respectively, and for ‘finds job boring’ 11, 6 and 8. Especially the ‘finds job boring’ outcomes 
are rather industry-specific: note for example that in four of five cases in finance and call 
centres the perceived stress-levels are higher in MNEs, while in four cases in transport and 
telecom they are lower. The outcomes for the fourth indicator, ‘Work physically exhausting’, 
slightly point at higher levels in domestic firms, with respectively 9 times a higher score in 
MNEs, 12 times in domestics, and 8 times no difference. In transport and telecom physically 
                                                 
56  Cf. Karolina Ekholm (2004) Multinational enterprises and their effect on labour markets, in Bo Södersten 
(ed.) Globalization and the Welfare State. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 74-95, here: 83. 
57  OECD / ILO Conference on Corporate Social Responsibility (2008) Report. The Impact of Foreign Direct 
Investment on Wages and Working Conditions. Paris, 23-24 June, 14. 
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exhausting work consistently scores higher in domestic firms, while in retail the results are 
indifferent or indicate a higher perceived level in MNEs. 
Table 7 Differences between scores on work-stress related issues in MNE and non-MNE 
firms (%-points), by country and industry 
  BE FI DE NL PL ES UK 
Metal & electronics   
Finds job stressful difference MNE-non-MNE 0.1 - 0 0.1 0 0 -
Work physically 
exhausting 
difference MNE-non-MNE 0 - -0.2 -0.3 0.1 -0.3 -
Work mentally 
exhausting 
difference MNE-non-MNE 0 - 0 -0.1 0.2 -0.2 -
Finds job boring difference MNE-non-MNE 0 - 0 0 0.1 0.1 -
Finance & call centres  
Finds job stressful difference MNE-non-MNE 0 - 0 0 -0.1 -0.1 -
Work physically 
exhausting 
difference MNE-non-MNE 0.1 - 0.1 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -
Work mentally 
exhausting 
difference MNE-non-MNE 0 - 1.0 0.2 -0.3 0.1 -
Finds job boring difference MNE-non-MNE 0 - 1.0 0.2 0.3 0.3 -
Transport & telecom  
Finds job stressful difference MNE-non-MNE 0 - -0.2 0.2 0 -0.3 -
Work physically 
exhausting 
difference MNE-non-MNE -0.3 - -0.8 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -
Work mentally 
exhausting 
difference MNE-non-MNE 0.1 - 0.4 0 0 0 -




Finds job stressful difference MNE-non-MNE 0.1 - 0 0.1 0.2 0.2 -
Work physically 
exhausting 
difference MNE-non-MNE -0.1 - 2.0 0.1 -0.1 0.1 -
Work mentally 
exhausting 
difference MNE-non-MNE 0 - 1.0 0.1 0.1 0 -
Finds job boring difference MNE-non-MNE 0 - 1.5 0 0.3 0.1 -
Retail  
Finds job stressful difference MNE-non-MNE 0.2 - 0.2 0.3 0 0.2 -
Work physically 
exhausting 
difference MNE-non-MNE 0 - 0 0.1 0.2 0 -
Work mentally 
exhausting 
difference MNE-non-MNE 0.2 - 0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.1 -
Finds job boring difference MNE-non-MNE -0.1 - 0 0 0.2 -0.1 -
 
As for countries, Spain shows the most outcomes with higher perceived work-stress in 
domestic firms (9 times), while for Poland (5 times, of which three in finance and call 
centres), Belgium (4), Germany (4, of which three in transport and telecom) and the 
Netherlands (4) these figures are considerably lower. 
 
The second working conditions issue regards experiences with the incidence of 
reorganizations and respondents’ expectations in this field. Table 8 (next page) exposes, in 
%-points, the differences between percentages of respondents reporting to have faced (at 
least one) reorganisation in the previous year, and percentages reporting to expect a 
reorganisation in the next 12 months, in MNEs and domestic firms, by country and industry. 
This data is available for five respectively four countries; in the Netherlands the question on 
expected reorganizations was not included in the survey for the period under study. 
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Table 8 Differences between percentages reporting that organization faced reorganisation, 
and percentages reporting to expect a reorganisation in the next 12 months, in 
MNE and non-MNE firms (%-points), by country and industry 








15% - 14% 12% 30% - 12% 
Reorganization 
expected in 12 m. 
difference MNE-
non-MNE 
16% - 18% - 5% - 8% 





15% - 11% 20% 12% - 9% 
Reorganization 
expected in 12 m. 
difference MNE-
non-MNE 
19% - 15% - 3% - 7% 





0% - 21% 9% 8% - 10% 
Reorganization 
expected in 12 m. 
difference MNE-
non-MNE 








12% - 18% 17% 21% - 22% 
Reorganization 
expected in 12 m. 
difference MNE-
non-MNE 
13% - 21% - 6% - 17% 





0% - 8% 4% -6% - 10% 
Reorganization 
expected in 12 m. 
difference MNE-
non-MNE 
17% - 9% - 6% - 13% 
 
Concerning experienced reorganizations the evidence is clear and near-univocal: workers in 
MNEs report more often than their colleagues in domestic firms that ‘their’ organisation 
faced reorganisations in the previous year. The only exception in 25 cases is retail in 
Poland. Moreover, in Belgium transport and telecom and retail show no difference in this 
respect between MNEs and non-MNEs. As for industries, the largest differences between 
the outcomes for both categories can be found in the IT industry (unweighted average 
18.0%-points), followed by metal and electronics manufacturing (16.6%-pts) and finance 
and call centers (13.4), whereas the differences are much smaller in transport and telecom 
(9.6) and especially in retail (3.2). Germany seems to be the most ‘reorganisation-prone’ 
country (unweighted average 14.4%-points), but the differences with Poland (13.3), the UK 
(12.6) and the Netherlands (12.4) remain rather small; only Belgium (8.4) scores 
substantially lower. 
 
Concerning expected reorganizations, the outcomes are largely in line with those 
concerning previous reorganizations. Again, the evidence is univocal: in all four countries 
and five industries employees in MNEs reported more to expect a reorganisation in the year 
to come than their colleagues in domestic firms did. In Belgium and Germany the 
differences between MNEs and domestic firms concerning expected reorganisations were 
larger than the differences concerning previous reorganisations for all five industries. In 
Poland this was the case for four industries, in the UK for two. Compared to the outcomes 
on previous reorganisations, the scores for the various industries on expected 
reorganisations came much closer. Much more often than their colleagues in domestic 




7. MNEs and domestic firms: industrial relations 
 
In this section we turn to three core issues in industrial relations: the incidence of trade 
union membership (union density); collective bargaining coverage, and the incidence of 
workplace employee representation. Table 9 shows the differences between percentages of 
scores on these three issues in MNEs and domestic firms by country and industry, all 
expressed in %-points. One should take notice that the data on union density regard seven 
countries, those on collective bargaining coverage five countries (excl. Finland and Poland), 
and those on employee representation six countries (excl. Finland). 
 
Table 9 Differences between percentages being member of a trade union covered by a 
collective agreement, with employee representation, in MNE and non-MNE firms by 
country and industry 
  BE FI DE NL PL ES UK 
Metal & electronics   
Member of trade union difference MNE-non-MNE  -1% 3% 7% -1% 1% 1% 8%




17% - 35% -6% - 17% 15%
Employee representation difference MNE-non-MNE 33% - 43% 40% 8% 23% 22%
Finance & call centres  
Member of trade union difference MNE-non-MNE -4% 3% -1% 2% -1% 2% 4%
Covered by collective 
agreement 
difference MNE-non-MNE 28% - 8% 20% - 12% 15%
Employee representation difference MNE-non-MNE 32% - 11% 30% 11% 20% 15%
Transport & telecom  
Member of trade union difference MNE-non-MNE -13% -3% 5% -4% -6% 1% -4%
Covered by collective 
agreement 
difference MNE-non-MNE 2% - 26% -6% - 12% 1%
Employee representation difference MNE-non-MNE 11% - 35% 22% -9% 19% 7%
Information Techn.  
Member of trade union difference MNE-non-MNE 0% 2% 3% 0% 1% 5% 2%
Covered by collective 
agreement 
difference MNE-non-MNE 18% - 16% 16% - 17% -4%
Employee representation difference MNE-non-MNE 23% - 40% 38% -3% 27% 10%
Retail  
Member of trade union difference MNE-non-MNE 0% -16% 3% 2% 0% 6% 7%
Covered by collective 
agreement 
difference MNE-non-MNE 36% - 31% 2% - 25% 5%
Employee representation difference MNE-non-MNE 27% - 31% 32% 4% 37% 15%
 
Of the three industrial relations issues, the figures on union density are least in favour of 
workers in MNEs over domestic firms. In 22 of 35 cases union density is higher in MNEs 
than in domestic firms, in two cases they are at par and in 11 cases union density is lower in 
MNEs. These last cases are concentrated in transport and telecom, where in five of seven 
countries density is higher in domestic firms, sometimes considerably, up to 13%-points in 
Belgium. In the finance and call centre industry this is the case in three countries, in metal 
and electronics in two, in retail on one. In three Belgian industries union density is higher in 
domestic firms; in Finland, the Netherlands and Poland this is the case in two industries, in 
the UK in one industry. 
 
Collective bargaining coverage shows a more positive picture for workers in MNEs. There 
are only three exceptions to the rule that coverage is higher in MNEs than in domestic firms: 
Dutch metal and electronics and Dutch transport and telecom, and IT in the UK. The 
difference in favour of MNEs is largest in retail (unweighted average 19.8%-points), followed 
by finance and call centers (16.6%-pts), metal and electronics (15.6), IT (12.6) and transport 
and telecom (7.0). As for countries, Germany shows the widest difference (unweighted 
average 23.2%-points), followed by Belgium (20.2), Poland (16.0), the UK (6.4), and the 
17 
 
Netherlands (5.2). One should be aware that all these averages do hide widely dispersed 
outcomes per country and industry. 
 
Concerning workplace employee representation MNEs show the largest advantage for 
workers compared to domestic firms. In 11 cases this advantage even goes up to 30%-
points and more. In only two cases employee representation was more widespread in 
domestic firms: in Polish transport and telecom and in the Polish IT sector. Regarding 
industries, metal and electronics has the largest difference in favour of MNEs (unweighted 
average 28.2%-points), with retail ranking second (24.3%-pts), IT third (24.2), finance and 
call centers fourth (19.8) and transport and telecom (14.2) last. As for countries, the 
Netherlands shows the largest average difference (32.4%-points, unweighted), with 
Germany (32.0) as runner-up, Belgium and Spain both ranking third (each 25.2), and the 
UK (6.4) and Poland (2.2) clearly in the lower ranks. 
 
Calculated over the three industrial relations issues, IT and retail show the clearest 
advantages for workers in MNEs, with both only one negative sign and the highest 
averages. Transport and telecom shows the least advantageous picture, with seven (of 18) 
negative cases and the lowest averages. Metal and electronics manufacturing and finance 
and call centres take the middle positions. 
Over the three issues, Spain is the only country with only differences in favour of MNEs, 
followed by Germany with one negative sign. In the Netherlands (4 of 15 negative cases), 
Poland (4 of 10) and Finland (2 of 5), MNEs show their industrial relations advantages for 
workers least clearly. Belgium and the UK take positions in between. 
8. Conclusions 
As we showed, our outcomes concerning wages and employment are partly in line with the 
evidence from the literature, partly they are not. After controlling for five factors, Finland, 
Belgium and the Netherlands show up with negative or rather small wage premia in MNEs 
over domestic firms. The results for Poland, except for the retail industry showing large 
MNE premia, underline other findings that wage premia in CEECs may remain substantial. 
Again except for retail, the Spanish outcomes may be interpreted as a confirmation of what 
we said about the MNE premium in transition economies. The UK figures seem to confirm 
the lowering trend of MNE premia in high-income countries with flexible labour markets, 
though for the metal and electronics and the IT industries they do not. However, our findings 
for Germany, showing considerable MNE premia in all industries, contradicted recent other 
evidence for this country. 
In evaluating these outcomes, we went back to our evidence on notably relative wages and 
wage differentials by size (not shown here). Combinations of these figures indicate that 
especially in Belgium and Finland domestic firms in various industries maintain strong 
positions in the labour market. For Belgium this holds for domestic firms in retail and (at 
least in the period under scrutiny!) for the larger finance and call centre firms, in Finland for 
the domestic metal and electronics, retail and transport / telecom industries. In the 
Netherlands, domestic IT firms seem to have a rather strong labour market position too, as 
do domestic medium-sized and larger finance companies in Poland. Here, we touch upon 
issues rather neglected in the literature on MNE and FDI, i.e. on how MNEs are embedded 
in national industry and market structures, on their relationship with domestic enterprise, 
and how they compete in national labour markets.  
Especially the outcomes for retailing and for transport and telecom need still another 
additional explanation. We found strong evidence that MNEs active in Belgian, Finnish, 
Polish and Spanish retail as well as in Finnish, Polish, Spanish and UK transport and 
telecom have taken resort to outright wage pressure. In discussing drafts of our evidence, 
trade union officials from Spain and the UK added up proof for this argumentation. Such 





analyses of specific HRM practices of certain MNEs, for which in turn the relationship with 
the wider national industrial relations context deserves closer scrutiny too.  
 
The combined results for receiving overtime compensation, working overtime and the length 
of the working week point at different contractual relations dominating in MNEs compared to 
domestic firms. Obviously, considerably larger shares of MNE employees are expected to 
work overtime without receiving compensation than those working for domestic firms; for 
many MNE employees, working overtime is “part of the deal”. Such contractual relations 
may presuppose a MNE wage premium, as a kind of general compensation. Yet, as we 
saw, especially in Finland and Belgium the incidence of such premia can no longer be taken 
for granted. Though the various pieces of evidence from the literature are difficult to 
compare quantitatively and over time, one may get the impression that more generally MNE 
wage premia are decreasing. In the field of working conditions, compensation mechanisms 
for long, not compensated working hours do not show up that clearly either. For work-stress 
related issues, working for MNEs is not clearly advantageous for workers; on the contrary, 
there is a slight tendency for stress levels to be higher in MNEs. MNE employees 
experienced more reorganizations in the previous year, and are expecting that to continue. 
So, against all odds, we found that evidently compensation can be found in industrial 
relations at company level, i.e. in the better conditions for workers’ representation in MNEs 
over domestic firms. Trade union density is already on average higher in MNEs, while 
collective bargaining coverage is more clearly so. Except partially for Poland, the most 
evident advantage for workers in MNEs over their colleagues in domestic firms can be 
found in workplace employee representation. In our view these industrial relations outcomes 
are highly striking, and ask for further exploration and underpinning. 
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